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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950523-CA 
v. : 
CASPER DUNKEL, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JTOISPICTION ANP NATTOE OF PRPCEEPINSS 
This is an appeal from convictions for a violation of the 
Clandestine Drug Lab Act, a first degree felony, in violation of 
trtah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 & 5 (1996) , possession or use of 
lysergic acid diethylamide in a drug free zone with intent to 
distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (1996), and carrying a concealed weapon, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1995), 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction to review this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly rely on the unchallenged 
presentence report and a substantially complete diagnostic 
evaluation in sentencing defendant to prison, rather than 
ordering a third supplemental evaluation before sentencing 
defendant? "Before [the reviewing court] will overturn the 
sentence given by the trial court, 'it must be clear that the 
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978)). 
2. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he did 
not object to the presentence report or the diagnostic 
evaluation? "When . • . the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, [the appellate 
court] resolve[s] the issue as a matter of law." State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah 1994). In order to prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
establish (1) that his counsel's performance "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness;" and (2) that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant. Id, (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic 
evaluation - Commitment of defendant - Sentencing 
procedure. 
(1)(a)(i) In felony cases where the court is of the 
opinion imprisonment may be appropriate but desires 
more detailed information as a basis for determining 
the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by 
the presentence report, the court may in its discretion 
commit a convicted defendant to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic evaluation 
for a period not exceeding 90 days, 
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a 
complete study and evaluation of the defendant during 
that time, inquiring into matters including: 
(A) the defendants previous delinquency or 
criminal experience; 
(B) his social background; 
(C) his capabilities; 
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical 
health; and 
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs 
which may be available to suit his needs. 
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or 
by the expiration of additional commitment time the 
2 
court may grant, not exceeding a further period of 90 
days, the defendant shall be returned to the court for 
sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defendant 
or his attorney shall be provided with a written 
diagnostic evaluation report of results of the study, 
including any recommendations the Department of 
Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be 
helpful to a proper resolution of the case, 
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the 
court is supplemental to and becomes a part of the 
presentence investigation report. 
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report 
and recommendations, the court shall proceed to 
sentence a defendant in accordance with the sentencing 
alternatives provided under Section 76-3-201. 
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under 
this section does not constitute a commitment to 
prison. However, any person who is committed to prison 
following proceedings under this section shall be given 
credit against his sentence for the time spent in 
confinement for a presentence investigation report. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Casper Dunkel, was charged with a violation of 
the Clandestine Drug Lab Act, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 & 5 (1996) (Count I), a violation of 
the Illegal Tax Stamp Act, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (1992) (Count II), possession or use 
of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with intent to distribute, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2) (1992) (Count III), possession or use of lysergic 
acid diethylamide in a drug free zone with intent to distribute, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(1996) (Count IV), unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in a 
drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
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Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1996) (Count VI),1 and carrying a concealed 
weapon, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-504 (1995) (Count VII) (R. 4-5). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to a 
violation of the Clandestine Drug Lab Act (Count I), possession 
of lysergic acid diethylamide in a drug-free zone with intent to 
distribute (Count IV) and carrying a concealed weapon (Count 
VII), and Counts II, III and VI were dismissed (R. 36-42). 
Prior to sentencing, the trial court ordered that defendant 
be committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections for 
a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation (R. 62; 1/27/95 h'g, T. 9).2 
On March 24, 1995, following receipt of a presentence report 
and diagnostic evaluation, the trial court sentenced defendant to 
the statutory terms of five-years-to-life on the two first degree 
felonies and a term not to exceed one year on the class A 
misdemeanor, all sentences to run concurrently (R. 64-65).3 
Defendant, pro se, mistakenly appealed, to this Court (R. 
68). However, because the convictions were for first degree 
felonies, the appeal was directed to the Utah Supreme Court, 
which appointed the Utah County Public Defender Association to 
represent defendant (R. 74). Thereafter, the supreme court 
transferred the case back to this Court (R. 83). 
1
 Co-defendants Ethel Cindy Hall and Brenda Kinstad were 
charged in the same information with an additional offense in Count 
V (R. 4) . 
2
 The transcript of the initial sentencing hearing, held on 
January 27, 1995, is attached at Addendum A. 
3
 The transcript of the final sentencing hearing, held on 
March 24, 1995, is attached at Addendum B. 
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Following its notice to the parties of its sua sponte motion 
for summary disposition and its receipt of memoranda, this Court 
denied the motion. The Court also denied defendant's motion for 
a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing concerning 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, pursuant to rule 23B, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT PF THE FACTS 
A presentence report (PSR) was prepared for the initial 
sentencing hearing held on January 27, 1995 (1/27/95 h'g, T. 2). 
The report set out defendant's lengthy criminal history, though 
it lacked a notation of the criminal dispositions (PSR at 5-8) 
and contained Adult Probation and Parole's (APP) recommendation 
that defendant be denied probation and sentenced according to 
statute (PSR at last page). Notwithstanding the recommendation, 
the trial court ordered defendant committed to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for the preparation of a sixty-day 
diagnostic evaluation to determine whether any rehabilitative 
program might suit defendant's needs (R. 61-62; 1/27/95 h'g, T. 
9). The court also ordered that the evaluation be provided to 
the court, the county attorney and defense counsel not later than 
five days before the final sentencing hearing on March 24 (R. 
61) . 
The diagnostic evaluation (DE) was completed on March 22 and 
supplied to all parties the same day (R. 63, cover letter; R. 87 
at 3). Although Ms. Betty Davies, Director of the Diagnostic 
Unit, noted that the evaluation was in some respects incomplete, 
owing to the departure of defendant's case worker a week earlier 
(DE 5), the evaluation touched on all the areas requested by the 
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trial court.4 In accordance with the court's order, the 
evaluation updated defendant's criminal history, this time noting 
that defendant had been incarcerated three times when under the 
authority of the California Youth Authority (CYA) between 1969 
and 1974 and that he once escaped from the CYA Institution (DE 2-
3). Drawing on the attached report of Rosanita Cespedes, Ph.D., 
the evaluation set out the psychological tests administered to 
defendant, defendant's basic skill and intelligence levels and 
abilities, his multiple chemical and alcohol dependency, his 
antisocial personality disorder and his poor prognosis for 
treatment (DE 3). Ms. Davies also reported that she and the case 
worker assigned to defendant conducted the thinking errors 
assessment group in which defendant participated, and she 
identified and reported on several of defendant's errors (DE 4-
5). Ms. Davies also conducted defendant's final interview, 
noting that in spite of defendant's appearing sincere in his wish 
to change his life and to care for his family, "changing would be 
so difficult as to be nearly impossible" (DE 5). The evaluation 
noted that the Diagnostic Unit had referred defendant to the 
Odyssey House treatment program, where he had been accepted, but 
4
 The Sixty-Day Evaluation Order stated: 
1. Defendant is committed to the custody of 
the Division [sic] of Corrections for a period 
of sixty days, for a complete study of the 
defendant during that time, inquiring into 
such matters such as the defendant's previous 
delinquency or criminal experience, his/her 
social background, his/her capabilities, 
his/her mental, emotional and physical health, 
and the rehabilitative resources or programs 
which may be available to suit his/her needs. 
(R. 61-62) . 
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that defendant was not anxious to go, thinking that he did not 
need treatment as intensive as that thought necessary by the 
Diagnostic Unit (DE 6). The evaluation concluded that based on 
defendant's first degree felony convictions, his prior criminal 
record, his poor prognosis for change, and the impossibility of 
assuring the protection of the community, defendant should be 
committed to the Utah State Prison (DE 6-7). 
Defense counsel argued that he had only received the 
evaluation two days earlier and that he did not consider it 
complete or satisfactory in identifying available programs (R. 87 
at 3-4). Defense counsel argued that defendant's case worker had 
inferred that there would be representatives from various 
programs available to interview defendant and because that had 
not happened, the purpose of the evaluation had not been 
accomplished. Nonetheless, counsel drew the court's attention to 
Dr. Cespedes' recognition that long-term inpatient treatment was 
a possible option, and counsel requested that defendant be given 
the opportunity to participate in the Odyssey House program (R. 
87 at 5). 
The trial court agreed that the purpose in sending defendant 
to the Diagnostic Unit was to see if there was an appropriate 
program, but that defendant's negative attitude toward the 
Odyssey House program confirmed the evaluators' assessment of 
defendant's poor prognosis (R. 87 at 8). Based on the 
evaluators' conclusion that defendant would not perform well at 
Odyssey House, the only appropriate program for defendant, the 
court sentenced defendant to prison (R. 87 at 8-9). 
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SUMMARY OF AROTMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on a 
satisfactory presentence report and a substantially complete 
diagnostic evaluation in sentencing defendant to prison. The 
diagnostic evaluation submitted to the trial court substantially 
met the prescribed statutory requirements. The director of the 
Diagnostic Unit, who wrote the evaluation, had personally 
participated in one of defendant's assessment group sessions and 
in his final interview. The diagnostic evaluation was supported 
by a psychological evaluation. The presentence report, the 
diagnostic evaluation and the psychological evaluation documented 
at length and without equivocation that defendant was unable to 
take responsibility for his actions and that he had a poor 
prognosis for rehabilitation and should be sentenced to prison. 
Defendant corroborated the accuracy of those reports when he 
refused the Odyssey House drug treatment program. 
POINT II 
Defendant fails to show that his trial counsel's refusal to 
object to various aspects of the presentence report and 
diagnostic evaluation was unreasonable or other than trial 
strategy. Further, based on the adequacy of the diagnostic 
evaluation and defendant's prior criminal record, it is apparent 
that even had defendant objected as argued on appeal, it would 
have had no effect on the trial court's sentencing order. 
8 
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POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT 
BASED ON RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN A 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETE DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION 
Defendant argues that because his case worker left the 
Diagnostic Unit a week before the diagnostic evaluation was 
written by Ms. Davies, director of the Unit, that he received an 
incomplete, unreliable ten-day evaluation, rather than the sixty-
day evaluation order by the trial court. Therefore, he claims, 
the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a 
additional diagnostic period prior to the imposition of sentence. 
Appellant's Br. at 7-9. The argument is without merit. 
A. The Standard of Review 
The imposition of sentence "'rests entirely within the 
discretion of the court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" 
State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted). "Before [the appellate court] will 
overturn the sentence given by the trial court, 'it must be clear 
that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 
1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 
885, 887 (Utah 1978). *[T]he appellate court can properly find 
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man would take 
the view adopted by the trial court. . . . [The appellate court] 
will not reverse or modify a sentence prescribed by law unless it 
is clearly excessive or unless the trial court abused its 
discretion." Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887-88. 
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"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to 
upset the judgment." State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)). 
B. The Diagnostic Evaluation was 
Substantially Complete and Reliable 
The diagnostic evaluation submitted to the trial court was 
substantially complete and met the prescribed statutory 
requirements: 
(1)(a)(i) In felony cases where the court 
is of the opinion imprisonment may be 
appropriate but desires more detailed 
information as a basis for determining the 
sentence to be imposed than has been provided 
by the presentence report, the court may in 
its discretion commit a convicted defendant 
to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections for a diagnostic evaluation for a 
period not exceeding 90 days. 
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall 
conduct a complete study and evaluation of 
the defendant during that time, inquiring 
into matters including: 
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or 
criminal experience; 
(B) his social background; 
(C) his capabilities; 
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical 
health; and 
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs 
which may be available to suit his needs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1995). 
Notwithstanding Ms. Davies', the Unit Director, overly 
generous admission that the evaluation was not complete in all 
respects, the evaluation plainly addresses all of the 
requirements of section 76-3-404, with the possible exception of 
defendant's social background. That component, however, was more 
than amply addressed by the presentence report (PSR 9-11), 
letters of defendant's family and friends sent to defendant's 
10 
AP&P case worker which were incorporated into the presentence 
report (PSR 12-19) and other letters submitted to the trial court 
before sentencing (R. 47-60). 
Defendant makes no suggestion about what might be missing 
from the evaluation, relying only on Ms. Davies' acknowledgment 
that the evaluation is incomplete in some respects because of the 
departure of defendant's case worker one week before the 
evaluation was submitted to the court. From these facts 
defendant argues that he obtained only a ten-day, rather than a 
sixty-day, evaluation. Appellant's Br. at 9. The contention is 
meaningless because there is no prescription that a person 
committed to the Department of Corrections for a diagnostic 
evaluation for a certain period of time must be continuously 
evaluated over that period. Moreover, Ms. Davies remarks in the 
evaluation refute the contention. Specifically, Ms. Davies noted 
that she and defendant's Diagnostic Unit case worker had 
conducted defendant's thinking errors assessment group (DE 4), 
thus showing that his case worker was involved in his assessment 
before his departure. Further, Ms. Davies' participation in 
defendant's assessment group and his final interview (DE 5), her 
obvious review of the record and Dr. Cespedes' evaluation (DE 3-
4, 6), her contact with defendant's wife (DE 6) and her review of 
the case with the Diagnostic Unit staff (DE 7) show that she knew 
defendant's case and was able to generate a substantially 
complete report. 
In support of his "belief" that the diagnostic evaluation 
was incomplete and unreliable, defendant cites State v. Lipsky. 
608 P.2d 1241, 1244, 1248 (Utah 1980), and its progeny, for the 
proposition that the sentencing must be based on accurate 
11 
information. Appellant's Br. at 8. None of the cited authority 
is relevant to this case. See id. at 1248-49 (denial of due 
process where trial court failed to disclose presentence report 
to defendant prior to sentencing); State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 
1064, 1071-72 (Utah 1993) (sexual abuse treatment center report 
which consisted solely of double and triple hearsay was 
unreliable); Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1050-51 (no abuse of discretion 
in refusing probation where the defendant had sufficient 
opportunity to attack the presentence report and there was ample 
factual substance in the record to support the sentencing). 
Even if the evaluation was deficient in some respects, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant 
to prison, rather than the outpatient treatment setting he was 
angling for, considering the substantial basis in the record that 
defendant was a poor prospect for rehabilitation. In State v. 
Carson, the defendant also claimed that the trial court had 
abused its discretion in not ordering a second ninety-day 
diagnostic evaluation, which the Department of Corrections had 
itself requested in order to determine if the defendant qualified 
for a sexual offender program. State v. Carson. 597 P.2d 862, 
864 (Utah 1979). Noting that under section 76-3-404 the 
diagnostic evaluation was an optional tool available to, but not 
binding on, the trial court, the supreme court held that the 
evaluation submitted to the trial court constituted a sufficient 
factual basis on which to sentence the defendant. Id. at 864-66. 
See also Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1051-52 (sufficient factual basis to 
deny probation based on the defendant's denial of responsibility, 
diagnostic staff's finding the defendant a marginal candidate for 
probation, the fears of the victims, the recommendations of the 
12 
prosecutor and the rejection by the two treatment facilities most 
likely to help the defendant). 
C. The Trifrl Cwrt frafl 3 gyffjgj^t PfrgJP 
On which to ggBtww* Pefenflfrnt to Prigpn 
At sentencing the trial court had a presentence report and a 
sixty-day evaluation, both of which concluded that defendant was 
not an appropriate candidate for supervised probation in a 
treatment program and that he should be sentenced to prison (PSR 
20; DE 6-7). The evaluation was supported by the separate 
psychological evaluation of Dr. Cespedes, which identified five 
substance dependencies and found that defendant exhibited an 
antisocial personality and that his prognosis in treatment was 
poor (Psychological Evaluation, p. 3). The prosecutor also 
concurred with the recommendations of the diagnostic evaluation 
(R. 87 at 6-7) , which also noted that defendant did not qualify 
for probation because of his conviction on first degree felonies 
and that if the CYA escape from custody charge were included, 
defendant would not qualify for anything but prison regardless of 
the degree of the felonies (DE 6). 
At the conclusion of the initial sentencing hearing, the 
trial court was plainly disposed to sentence defendant to a 
program that would suit both the community's and defendant's 
needs, based on defense counsel's presentation of defendant as 
caring family man seduced by drugs at an early age and the 
prosecutor's acknowledgment that defendant had been "remarkably 
forthcoming" with information (1/27/95 h'g at 2-9). Ultimately, 
however, it was defendant that corroborated his evaluators' 
consensus that he was a poor prospect for rehabilitation, and 
consequently the propriety of the trial court's final sentencing 
13 
order, by his own conduct. Dr. Cespedes noted that defendant 
projected the appearance of an emotionally stable and predictable 
individual, but that he was deceitful, immature and self-
centered, blaming others for his problems rather than accepting 
responsibility for them (Psychological Evaluation at 2-3). Ms. 
Davies also noted that defendant sounded sincere about wanting to 
take responsibility for his life and family, but that he blamed 
others for his addiction and blamed the system for not having 
earlier put him into a treatment program (DE 5). True to the 
evaluators' assessments, defendant "begged" prior to sentencing 
to be put on a program in order to assist his family (PSR 4), but 
he rejected the demanding Odyssey House treatment program when it 
was offered to him (DE 6). As Ms. Davies astutely observed, 
"Sincere or not, changing would be so difficult as to be nearly 
impossible" (DE 5). See State v. Sweat. 722 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam) (no abuse of discretion in sentencing the 
defendant to prison rather than a substance abuse program where 
the evaluation team found the defendant not serious about 
changing his behavior). In sum, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in sentencing defendant to prison, rather than 
ordering an additional diagnostic evaluation. 
POINT II 
DEPENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective 
under Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984), in failing (1) to request an additional diagnostic 
commitment to complete the evaluation, (2) to alert the trial 
court to two mitigating circumstances omitted from the matrix, 
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(3) to object to having received the diagnostic evaluation only 
one and one-half days before sentencing and (4) to identify other 
treatment options or to allow defendant to testify about his 
willingness to participate in a treatment program. Appellant's 
Br. at 9-12. The claim is unsupported by the record. 
A . The fregfriH standard for Prpvi^g 
Iflsffegtive Assistance <?f Counsel 
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the two-part test set out in Strickland v. 
Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), in evaluating a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.5 The defendant must 
first "identify the acts or omissions" which, under the 
circumstances, "show that counsel's representation fell below an 
Objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 186. This 
requires a showing that counself s errors were so serious that he 
was not functioning as "counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. Secondly, the defendant "must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. 186-87. The defendant has the 
5
 The State notes in passing that Strickland dealt only with 
an ineffective assistance claim in a capital sentencing: %xWe need 
not consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing , which 
may involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in the 
sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to the 
definition of constitutionally effective assistance." Id. at 686, 
104 S. Ct. at 2064. The State is aware of only one Utah case, 
Pflygpns v, games; 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 
431 (1994), also a capital case, in which the Strickland standard 
has been considered in a sentencing context. Id. at 525-26. 
However, since the question of the appropriate standard is not 
directly at issue, for the purposes of this brief, the State does 
not dispute the application of Strickland in this sentencing. 
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burden of proof with respect to both prongs of the Strickland 
test. Id. at 186. "Defendant has the burden of demonstrating 
that counsel's 'performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment,' and that counsel's actions 
were not conscious trial strategy." State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant's burden is heavy: 
In proving the first prong of the Strickland 
test, the defendant must point to specific 
instances in the record where counself s 
assistance was inadequate. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In so 
doing, the defendant must overcome "a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S. 
Ct. at 2065. "This court will not 
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate 
strategic choices, however flawed those 
choices might appear in retrospect." TState 
v.1 Tennyson. 850 P.2d [461], 465 [(Utah App. 
1993)] (citing Strickland, 466 u.s. at 689, 
104 S. Ct. at 2065; State v. Pascual, 804 
P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App. 1991)). 
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). 
B. Defense Counsels Performance at Sentencing 
Was Reasonable and Professional 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing (1) to request an additional diagnostic commitment to 
complete the evaluation, (2) to alert the trial court to two 
mitigating circumstances omitted from the matrix, (3) to object 
to having received the diagnostic evaluation only one and one-
half days before sentencing and (4) to identify other treatment 
options or to allow defendant to testify about his willingness to 
participate in a treatment program. Appellant's Br. at 9-12. 
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The claim is unsupported by the record. Addressing 
defendant's claims in serial fashion, defense counsel's 
performance was reasonable : (1) there was no genuine basis for 
objecting to a substantially complete diagnostic evaluation, 
although, in fact, defense counsel did so object (R. 87 at 3-4); 
(2) although defense counsel did not specifically point out the 
omissions on the matrix itself (which could not have affected 
defendant's chances for probation based on his first degree 
felony convictions), he pointedly brought to the court's 
attention, which the court acknowledged, letters attesting that 
defendant had good employment prospects and family relations and 
that his imprisonment would be a significant hardship on his 
family (1/27/95 h'g at 6-7); (3) there was no substantial legal 
basis for requesting a continuance to challenge an evaluation 
received two days before sentencing, even if the trial court had 
originally ordered that the report be supplied to all parties 
five days before the sentencing; and (4) considering the extent 
of defendant's drug dependency, there were no treatment options 
other than Odyssey House, and based on defendant's having 
previously rejected that treatment option, allowing him to 
testify about his willingness for treatment would have appeared 
as nothing more than an exhibition of bad faith. 
In fact, it is apparent that defense counsel did an 
excellent job in recognizing and then responding to the way the 
wind was blowing at the sentencing, a direction that defendant 
himself created. Counsel effectively downplayed the extent of 
defendant's expanded criminal history, brought to light in the 
diagnostic evaluation, by observing that all had parties had 
recognized its extent at the initial hearing, but that the real 
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purpose of the evaluation, to locate other available programs, 
had been accomplished R. 87 at 4). Notwithstanding his argument, 
and recognizing the obvious force presented by the uniform 
opinions of defendant's multiple evaluators, counsel wisely-
encouraged the trial court to send defendant to Odyssey House (R. 
87 at 5, 8). In sum, defense counsel reasonably represented 
defendant at sentencing. 
c. pefenflfrnt Fails tP S E Q W ttat Be was 
Prejudiced fry cpwigel'g perfpnrtfrttce 
Even if the Court found that defense counsel performed 
ineffectively in failing to make the various challenges and 
clarifications argued on appeal, defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance would still fail under the second prong of Strickland, 
which requires the defendant to show that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. *It is not enough for the 
defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 
the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. 
Accord Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1107 (Utah 1983); Stfrte 
v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988); State v. Frame. 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). If the defendant fails to make the 
required showing of either deficient performance or of sufficient 
prejudice as a result of counsel's error, then defendant 
ineffectiveness claim is defeated." State v. Grueber. 776 P.2d 
70, 76 (Utah App.), cert- denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant merely speculates that his counsel's conduct was 
deficient. Rather, it is apparent that even if counsel had acted 
in accord with defendant's argument on appeal, the trial court 
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would not have sentenced defendant differently, based on 
defendant's prior record and the force and consistency with which 
defendant's various evaluator's found him a poor prospect for 
rehabilitation. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Based on this Court's prior development of the issues raised 
in this case, the State does not request oral argument. 
CQNC&TOIQN 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions. -A^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^> day of April, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
is r /^/y 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Margaret P. Lindsay, Utah County Public Defenders 
Assoc, attorneys for defendant, 40 South 100 West, Suite 200, 
Provo, Utah 84601, this /& day of April, 1996. 
19 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SENTENCING HEARING 
Case No. 941400767 
STATE 
vs 
CASPER 
OF 
• 
UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
DUNKEL, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Hon. Ray M. Harding 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of 
January, 1995 this matter came on regularly for 
hearing before the above-named Court. 
WHEREUPON, all parties appearing and 
represented by counsel, the following proceedings 
were held: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE P L A I N T I F F : 
CRAIG R. MADSEN, ESQ. 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 EAST CENTER, STE 2100^ 
PR0V0, UT 84606 ' JBLED 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
H
°V 1 3 1995 
LEE RASMUSSEN, ESQ. G ^ ^ ^ P * * 
2 1 1 EAST 3 0 0 SOUTH, STE 2 1 3 UOOrf 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
9*@S 23 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - (LIC. NO. 93) 
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST - SALEM, UT 84653 
PHONE: 423-1009 
r \ 
1 II P R O C E E D I N G S . 
2 THE COURT: Number 12, State of Utah 
3 versus Dunkel. 
4 MR. NADSEN: Mr. Rasmussen I think is 
5 speaking with Mr. Dunkel through the window. 
6 They'll be right here. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. This is the time set 
8 for pronouncement of sentence in this matter. Is 
9 there any legal reason why sentence should not now 
10 be imposed? 
11 MR. RASMUSSEN: There is none. Your 
12 Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Very well. Any statement that 
14 you would like to make prior to imposition of 
15 sentence? 
16 MR. RASMUSSEN: I would, Your Honor. I 
17 have reviewed the presentence report. I find it a 
18 little disturbing to look and see all these things 
19 of not available, not available, not available. 
20 I took an opportunity to kind of check on 
21 some of these things. I've been able to determine 
22 that a lot of these not available ones are strictly 
23 from investigative stops that were made for, from 
24 probation where they, in California they 
25 automatically take fingerprints when they do that 
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1 and they are provided to the California Bureau of 
2 Investigation and then they are automatically 
3 entered in the current criminal history without a 
4 disposition. 
5 There's no disposition to obtain. In 
6 most of these, these were various charges that he 
7 was brought back in on for checking. I could go 
8 back and just give you a flavor of them. The first 
9 one there I believe is in September of v67. He was 
10 only questioned in that particular matter that 
11 somebody else was arrested. He was never, ever 
12 charged in that. I believe it was a girlfriend of 
13 his or boyfriend that ended up with it. 
14 There are a lot of duplications of 
15 charges. In looking at his juvenile record, in 
16 '68 the two failures to appear are really the same 
17 ticket in August and October of '68. This is for 
18 sleeping on the beach, for being on the beach. 
19 That's kind of the flavor. 
20 I find one of them here that's kind of 
21 interesting. The charges on, from the Riverside 
22 County Sheriff's Office on July 29th of '76, March 
23 25th of '77, June 30th of '79 and subsequently out 
24 of New Orleans are all from the same central 
25 focus. They are all one particular case which was 
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1 II a misdemeanor case. That's why there's not 
2 dispositions available. And this was just simply a 
3 fine which he had failed to pay. 
4 II As I have gone over his record I find that 
5 the last conviction, the felony conviction that he 
6 has was in 1977. I think that there's some 
7 interesting things that happened in Casper's life 
8 in about that particular time. Be seems to take a 
9 big change. He's been on probation for a period of 
10 time then with the California Youth Authority and 
11 he seems to stay pretty crime free from '77 up 
12 until this particular episode, with the exception 
13 of I believe he has a couple DUIs, driving under 
14 the influence in there. 
15 Casper in about that time of life began to 
16 settle down. It really settled down I think 12 
17 years ago when he got married to his present wife, 
18 and she's in the courtroom today. But when he got 
19 married he obtained custody of his infant son from 
20 a, or a two year old son at that time, from a 
21 previous marriage. Be, or his wife has adopted 
22 that child now. 
23 They've also adopted two children who are 
24 disadvantaged children. They have a son who is 
25 autistic and who has, actually had been doing very 
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1 well as long as there was funds to support him. 
2 Be has currently been placed in a group home for 
3 autistic children because well, Casper's not 
4 working in the legal occupation of a journeyman 
5 electrician, there's not funds to provide for the 
6 care of this particular child and they've been 
7 forced to put him in a group home. 
8 They also adopted a disadvantaged daughter 
9 who was educationally disadvantaged. Not from her 
10 mental ability but because she had been, hadn't had 
11 the opportunity to go to school and she was way 
12 behind in her grade development. She is now up to 
13 grade level, performing adequately and acceptably 
14 for grade level for her age. In fact, the family 
15 was awarded from the school some meritorious thing 
16 for how they have been able to help this child get 
17 up to where she should be. 
18 Be'8 been basically a good family man in 
19 the, you know, raising these children in a 
20 substantial marriage. Bis wife is here today 
21 along with his son. We had asked that the children 
22 didn't come because this is probably someplace they 
23 don't need to see their dad* The younger children 
24 have stayed home but his one son who is 17 now was 
25 insistent on being here and he's in the courtroom 
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1 today along with some other family members. 
2 Bis wife would like to address the Court 
3 but she has a heart problem and Casper has asked 
4 that, he thinks that's too much stress on her. 
5 TEE COURT: Well, I've read her letter to 
6 the Court--
7 MR. RASMUSSEN: Yes. They are— 
8 THE COURT: And I suspect she doesn't 
9 have anything to add to that. 
10 MR. RASMUSSEN: I don't think so. But 
11 she wants you to know that even with her health 
12 problem, which is a heart condition, that she is 
13 prepared to demonstrate to the Court her support 
14 for her husband which I think speaks something 
15 well. 
16 In going through this case with Mr. Madsen 
17 we entered into a stipulation which I think is very 
18 important. And I'm sure the Court has read that 
19 stipulation. But that stipulation basically says 
20 that Casper really didn't know what he was doing. 
21 He was probably a first time trier, trying to 
22 produce methamphetamines. Be was, didn't have the 
23 ability to do it either with the chemicals that 
24 they had or the knowledge that he had. Be 
25 certainly did have a precursor to the development 
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1 of it which fits the statute, and there's no 
2 question that what he entered a plea to is a 
3 violation of the law. But as far as having the 
4 sophisticated knowledge to produce the product 
5 which would be used for sale, they were off base in 
6 this particular episode. 
7 He is a journeyman electrician. He 
8 learned that skill while he was in probation. 
9 That skill has served-- Through the California 
10 Youth Authority. That skill has served him 
11 well. He has been able to make a satisfactory 
12 living. 
13 He has always had a problem with narcotics 
14 and that problem with narcotics has escalated and 
15 gotten him into deep trouble, very deep trouble at 
16 this particular time. But I think that there are 
17 some things that are alternative to prison then 
18 that the AP&P has recommended that may be 
19 beneficial to him and to his family and I hope to 
20 society. He does have a lot to offer. 
21 And I would recommend that the Court place 
22 him on probation, that they put him in appropriate 
23 controls, perhaps intensive supervised probation 
24 and programs which can address his narcotics 
25 problem and teach him those skills that when he's 
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1 depressed, that when he's stressed that he does not 
2 have to turn to narcotics to satisfy or to overcome 
3 these problems that he has in his life. 
4 We would request that you reject the 
5 recommendations of AP&P and place him on a form of 
6 probation with required programs. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Madsen? 
8 MR. MADSEN: Your Honor, I have examined 
9 the report. I've also received information 
10 through Counsel, from the time of this arrest this 
11 defendant has become I think fairly remarkably 
12 forthcoming with his information. He has never 
13 denied culpability and has provided a lucid account 
14 of the events. 
15 I have examined the situation with the 
16 defendant. I am prepared to stipulate to a 
17 diagnostic, to see if the diagnostic unit can find 
18 something that will meet the requirements of the 
19 offense and meet the requirements of the defendant, 
20 but more importantly meet the requirements of the 
21 community. I can't have cooks of methamphetamine 
22 in the county. It's a dangerous drug and it's a 
23 dangerous procedure and this one was being 
24 attempted in the middle of an overcrowded trailer 
25 park* 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
II PAGE 8 
1 So I am prepared to stipulate to a 
2 diagnostic report. 
3 THE COURT: I'm glad to hear that because 
4 that's the Court's inclination upon review of the 
5 matter. All right. I am going to stay imposition 
6 of sentence at this time. Order the defendant 
7 remanded to the custody of the Utah County Sheriff 
8 to be transported to the Department of Corrections, 
9 Utah State Prison for a 60-day diagnostic 
10 evaluation, for them to review his status and make 
11 recommendations relative to an appropriate program 
12 for his drug addiction. That he be returned to 
13 this Court with a written report with their 
14 recommendations on or before--
15 THE CLERK: March 24th. 
16 THE COURT: The 24th of March at 8:00 
17 o'clock A.M. Thank youf Counsel. 
18 MR. RASMUSSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
19 II WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 II REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 || ) SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
4 
5 
6 II I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand 
7 Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
8 Utah, do hereby certify that I received the 
9 electronically recorded tape #9514 in the matter 
10 of STATE VS. DUNKEL and that I transcribed it into 
11 typewriting, and that a full, true and correct 
12 transcription of said hearing so recorded and 
13 transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages 
14 numbered 1 through 9, inclusive and that said pages 
15 constitute an accurate and complete transcript of 
16 all the testimony and proceedings adduced at the 
17 proceedings and contained on the tape except where 
18 it is indicated that the tape recording was 
19 inaudible. 
20 WITNESS my hand and official seal this 6th day 
21 of November, 1995 
22 
23 
24 L 
• i t n n r r f 1 ^ T E p N Y C^ABBOTT, CSR. 
COULEXPIRES»44-ttoftary (Publ ic 
jJ24-96 Commission Exp. 
25 || LICENSE #93 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CASPER M. DUNKEL, 
Defendant. 
1 
SENTENCING 
Case No. 941400767 
H o n . RAY M. HARDING 
ORIGINAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of 
March, 1995 this matter came on for hearing before 
the HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, Judge of the 
above-named court. 
WHEREUPON, the plaintiff and defendant both 
appearing and represented by counsel the following 
proceedings were held: 
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
2 THE COURT: #21, State of Utah versus 
3 Dunkel. This is the time set for pronouncement of 
4 sentence in this matter. Any legal reason why 
5 sentence should not now be imposed? 
6 MR. RASMUSSEN: There is none. 
7 THE COURT: Any statement that you'd like 
8 to make prior to the imposition of sentence? 
9 MR. RASMUSSEN: Yes, Your Honor, there 
10 is. I'm sure that you've had the opportunity to 
11 read the diagnostic report. I received it late in 
12 the afternoon of the 22nd and went through it. 
13 I'm actually a little discouraged with 
14 this report. In having talked with Mr. Dunkel this 
15 morning, to me it's a regurgitation of the 
16 presentence investigation with the one letter from, 
17 or the evaluation from the psychologist there. 
18 In addition, what I've learned is that 
19 Paul Larsen, who was the evaluator that was 
20 assigned to Mr. Dunkel, during the middle of this 
21 evaluation retired or left the services. I don't 
22 know necessarily under the greatest— I don't know 
23 under what cloud or even if there was a cloud but 
24 he is gone and didn't find this. Consequently I 
25 think the Court probably, I hope the Court read 
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1 into here that this was not what I would consider a 
2 complete evaluation or what I hoped to see that the 
3 diagnostic unit would do down there. 
4 When we left here we knew about his 
5 criminal record and I think the clear intent of the 
6 Court was to see if there was a program that was 
7 available to him. I don't even know that 
8 Mr. Dunkel was afforded that opportunity under 
9 Ms. Davies and her writing of this report. I know 
10 Mr. Larsen had made promises to, or inferences or 
11 promises I guess, to Mr. Dunkel that there would be 
12 people there from various programs to talk to 
13 him. That never ever occurred. I don't know if, 
14 what these people really determined, or perhaps it 
15 would have the same results, I donft know. But 
16 absent that I don't think we accomplished the 
17 purpose that he was sent to the diagnostic unit 
18 for. 
19 There are some inaccuracies in the report, 
20 none that I think would be influential to the Court 
21 one way or the other. One that I would probably 
22 like to draw to the Court's attention is that he 
23 does have contact with his children including the 
24 son by the previous marriage, and he has taken 
25 responsibility for those types of things. 
II PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
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1 It appears to me that, that (inaudible), 
2 the Ph.D. who interviewed him did make an 
3 observation that a long term intensive structured 
4 in-patient program utilizing cognitive 
5 restructuring in groups and individual therapy are 
6 recommended. And she's saying that not as a 
7 recommendation but as a possible option. That's 
8 what I thought we sent Mr. Dunkel to the prison to 
9 determine, if there was an option. 
10 It appears from my reading that if that's 
11 what the Court is looking for there is, they've 
12 only recommended one program and that being the 
13 Odyssey House in Salt Lake City. And even though I 
14 think he's been short-termed a little bit on the 
15 diagnostic evaluation I still think that they have 
16 said that this type of program would be beneficial 
17 to him if the Court felt that that was 
18 appropriate. And we would certainly recommend 
19 that he be given that opportunity. 
20 He's still the strong-- I mean that we 
21 know that so few people really complete this 
22 program that if he's adequately motivated he's 
23 going to benefit and be available to his family. 
24 If he doesn't, he's not going to be present. So 
25 we would recommend that the Court place him in that 
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1 program. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. RASMUSSEN: Did you want to say 
4 something? 
5 (Inaudible discussion with defendant?) 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Madsen? 
7 MR. MADSEN: Well, Your Honor, I think 
8 that it•s somewhat of an incorrect characterization 
9 to say that they didn't consider programs or didn't 
10 consider other programs. They did a psychological 
11 evaluation on this defendant and identified five 
12 substance dependencies for abuse and antisocial 
13 personality disorders. And then they indicate 
14 treatment is unlikely to succeed because they know 
15 (inaudible) referrals, that he was referred to 
16 Odyssey House and that they did agree to accept him 
17 but Mr. Dunkel is the one who is not anxious to go 
18 to Odyssey House, anything that long or intensive, 
19 because he doesn't think he needs that much 
20 treatment. And they think he needs more treatment 
21 than is even available at Odyssey House. 
22 And the simple fact is they did evaluate 
23 him, did determine he had an intensive need for 
24 treatment. He admits to be an abuser for more than 
25 30 years and that his belief is he doesn't need 
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1 that much treatment, that makes him untreatable. 
2 II It's not that the program won't do him any good, 
3 II it's that he doesn't think he needs the program. 
4 Furthermore, they said that the justice 
5 requirements they believe validates prison, and 
6 they even go so far as to say if they had included 
7 the California Youth Authority escape from custody 
8 charge, he would have not qualified for anything 
9 other than prison, no matter what the degree of 
10 offense has been, with his previous record. 
11 I think that they have very carefully 
12 evaluated this defendant. They've referred him to 
13 programs, they've had him examined, they've had him 
14 psychologically evaluated and they've made a 
15 determination that he's just not treatable in the 
16 current disposition, the personal disposition, his 
17 personal beliefs about his problems and his 
18 recognition of what needs to be done about them. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Rasmussen? 
2 0 11 MR. RASMUSSEN: Well, I don't know if we 
21 just added the programs in the plural on there by 
22 accident or not. I think that he's only been 
23 referred to one program. I think all of us in this 
24 situation would prefer not to go to Odyssey with 
25 that recommendation. I certainly wouldn't want to 
II PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
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1 go there no matter what it accomplished. But if 
2 thatfs the type of program that they feel that 
3 could help him, and our purpose in sending him was 
4 finding something that could help him, maybe that's 
5 where we should send him. 
6 THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I agree that 
7 that was in fact the purpose of sending him for the 
8 diagnostic was to see if there was an appropriate 
9 program. The evaluation clearly indicated that 
10 his motivation for therapy was poor and he, I think 
11 that there was a serious question about his ability 
12 to perform in any program even though they 
13 recommended, and as you read the recommendation I 
14 think you're right, the only program that fits the 
15 characterization of the evaluator would be the 
16 Odyssey House. He was then referred to or 
17 recommended possibly to the Odyssey House and I 
18 think his negative attitude towards that program 
19 indicates that he confirms the evaluator's position 
20 that he would not perform well. And I don't think 
21 we have the resources to waste on someone who we 
22 know going in is not going to make the requisite 
23 efforts. 
24 It'll be the judgment and sentence of this 
25 Court that the defendant serve a term of from five 
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1 years to possibly as long as life in the Utah State 
2 Prison on the first degree felony; and a term of 
3 not to exceed one year in the Utah County Jail on 
4 the Class A misdemeanor. The Court will order 
5 those terms to run concurrently. Court will 
6 remand the defendant to the custody of the 
7 Department of Corrections to commence serving the 
8 term as prescribed by law, 
9 MR. NADSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
11 WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded. 
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